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Abstract
We analyze the limit behavior of sequences of oligopolistic equilib-
ria in which ﬁrms follow objectives consistent with their shareholders’
interests. We show that the eﬃciency of the limit allocation depends
on how ﬁrms’ shares are distributed across consumers, and provide
a characterization of the class of ownership structures that lead to
Walrasian equilibrium allocations in the limit.
1 Introduction
Perfectly competitive (or price taking) behavior is believed to arise – and is
generally justiﬁed in the literature – when the number of economic agents
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that interact in the market is large, and each agent is small relative to the
whole economy. There are, however, examples that show how monopoly
proﬁts and ineﬃcient allocations can persist in equilibrium, even with an ar-
bitrarily large number of small, competing agents. In an environment without
uncertainty (or with uncertainty but a complete set of contingent securities)
this happens if, as the economy grows larger, the sequence of its (oligopolis-
tic) equilibria approaches a critical equilibrium point of the limit economy
(Roberts 1980). The results of this paper uncover yet another possible source
of ineﬃciency in large economies: the ﬁrms’ ownership structures. If ﬁrms
pursue their shareholders’ interests, the way shares are allocated across con-
sumers plays an important role in achieving eﬃciency in the limit.
For a ﬁrm that has market power, the choice of a production plan aﬀects
shareholders’ real wealth in two ways: through the proﬁts it generates (we
will call this the income eﬀect), and through the change in market prices it
induces (we call this the price eﬀect). It is well-known that these can be
opposite eﬀects (see, for example, Dierker and Grodal (1999), Bejan (2008))
and thus the production plan that maximizes ﬁrm’s proﬁt, under some price
normalization,1 may not maximize the welfare of ﬁrm’s shareholders.
One would expect a ﬁrm’s production choice to be consistent with its
shareholders’ interests but, typically, no production plan will be unanimously
supported by all shareholders. We say that a production plan chosen by a
ﬁrm is compatible with its shareholders’ interests (given the production plans
chosen by the other ﬁrms) if no other production plan makes all shareholders
better oﬀ (provided that the other ﬁrms do not change their plans). Such
a production plan is therefore eﬃcient (or Pareto undominated) from the
point of view of the ﬁrm’s shareholders and will be called 푆-eﬃcient (with 푆
standing for “shareholders”). We are interested in the strategic interaction
of a large number of ﬁrms whose objective is compatible with their share-
1Proﬁt maximization is not well-deﬁned in this context unless it is speciﬁcally linked
to a particular price normalization. For a discussion of this well-known issue the reader is
referred to Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) or Dierker and Grodal (1999).
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holders’ interests, in the sense of selecting 푆-eﬃcient production plans. The
Cournot-Nash equilibria of such game played by the ﬁrms must then have
the property that every ﬁrm’s equilibrium production plan is 푆-eﬃcient given
the production plans of the others. We call such equilibrium a Cournot 푆-
equilibrium. Although we assume, for simplicity, that the interests of all
shareholders govern the decisions of a ﬁrm, our results also hold under the
weaker assumption that a ﬁrm’s objective is shaped by the interests of a
smaller “control group” such as the Board of Directors.
We study the limit behavior of Cournot 푆-equilibrium production plans
of a sequence of private ownership economies and show that, depending on
the ownership structure, the equilibria may or may not approach a Walrasian
equilibrium of the limit economy. A suﬃcient condition for convergence to
competitive equilibrium is to have a uniform lower bound on the number
of shares owned by all (controlling) shareholders in any ﬁrm. The result is
fairly intuitive. For suﬃciently large economies (i.e., large number of com-
peting ﬁrms), the price eﬀect of each ﬁrm’s action on its shareholders’ welfare
becomes almost negligible. However, if the ownership of a given ﬁrm is dis-
persed among a large number of shareholders, so that each of them holds
only a tiny fraction of the ﬁrm, the income eﬀect of that ﬁrm’s choices on
their wealth must be negligible as well. Thus the price eﬀect, albeit be-
coming negligible itself, may still dominate the income eﬀect. As a result,
shareholders may disapprove the maximization of proﬁts in arbitrarily large
economies. Our results suggest that, while perfect portfolio diversiﬁcation
might be optimal from an investor’s point of view (as suggested by CAPM-
style models) it may not lead to eﬃciency economy-wide when ﬁrms pursue
their shareholders’ interests.
One of the major diﬃculties in studying the limit behavior of a sequence
of Cournot 푆-equilibria is deﬁning a notion of “closeness” on the space of
private ownership production economies. For the case of pure-exchange, rep-
resenting an economy as a distribution on the space of agents’ characteristics
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(Hildenbrand 1970, Hildenbrand 1975) enables the use of weak convergence
of measures to deﬁne a topology on the space of economies. For a production
economy, the space of characteristics must be enlarged to include ﬁrms’ pro-
duction sets and ownership structure. However, as opposed to preferences,
endowments or production sets, an ownership structure is intrinsically re-
lated to a space of consumers and a space of ﬁrms, and it is not obvious how
such ownership structure can be included in a space of characteristics that
is agent-independent. Even when restricting attention to economies with
a ﬁnite number of types of consumers and ﬁrms, the separation of owner-
ship from the actual names of consumers and ﬁrms is diﬃcult, unless one
is willing to make very restrictive symmetry assumptions on the ownership
structure. A familiar example of such symmetry requirement is that every
consumer of type 푖 owns equal shares in all the ﬁrms of type 푗 (Gabszewicz
and Vial 1972, Mas-Colell 1980). As some of our results show, focusing on
such speciﬁc symmetry of the ownership structure, one is bound to miss
important insights that are revealed only in more heterogeneous economies.
We construct here a general framework that embeds any private own-
ership production economy and allows for a natural topological structure,
which generalizes other topologies deﬁned in the literature, over more re-
strictive spaces of economies. We also show that a continuum production
economy is a good approximation for a large ﬁnite economy, since it can be
written as the limit of ﬁnite economies.
Hart (1979) proves, in related work, that if a ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts (un-
der a speciﬁc price normalization), then each shareholder’s gain from switch-
ing to his most preferred production plan diminishes as the economy grows
larger. Thus, Hart’s result implies that proﬁt maximization by oligopolistic
ﬁrms is approximately in the best interest of each ﬁrm’s shareholder if the
economy is large enough. By contrast, we show that if a ﬁrm follows an ob-
jective that is consistent with its shareholders’ interests, then it will choose a
plan that is close to the (Walrasian) proﬁt maximizing plan, if the economy
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is large enough and the ownership is not too diﬀuse. Hart’s results do not
imply ours, but can rather be seen as a converse to this paper. The standard
oligopolistic equilibria and Cournot 푆-eﬃcient equilibria may not be Pareto
ranked. Indeed, a change in one ﬁrm’s production plan to a plan that im-
proves the welfare of its shareholders may result in a decreased utility for the
shareholders of other ﬁrms, via the price eﬀects. Hence, although each ﬁrm
can improve the welfare of its shareholders by a unilateral deviation from the
(normalized) proﬁt maximization objective, a Cournot 푆-equilibrium plan
that Pareto dominates the standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium plan may not
exist.
The paper is organized as follows. We start, in section 2, by giving an
example that illustrates the main points of the paper. In section 3 we set up
a general framework for describing private ownership production economies
and show how the standard Arrow-Debreu economies and their replicas can
be embedded in this framework. The Cournot 푆-equilibrium concept and
some of its properties are described in section 4. Section 5 deﬁnes a topology
on the space of private ownership economies and provides conditions on the
ownership structure such that convergence to Walrasian equilibrium obtains.
Section 6 concludes.
2 An illustrative example
Let ℰ1 be an Arrow-Debreu economy with two goods, two consumers and
one ﬁrm. Consumers have identical preferences over consumption of the
two goods, represented by the utility 푢 : ℝ2+ → ℝ, 푢(푐1, 푐2) = ln 푐1 + ln 푐2.
The endowment of goods of consumer 1, respectively 2, are 푒1 = (4, 4),
respectively 푒2 = (4, 2). The ﬁrst consumer is the sole owner of the ﬁrm,
whose production set is 푌 := {(−훼, 훼) ∣ 훼 ∈ [0, 1]}. We will refer to the
economy ℰ1 as the prototype economy.
It is assumed throughout that consumers are price takers in all markets
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while every ﬁrm behaves strategically, internalizing the eﬀect of its choices
of production plans on the market prices. Unlike the standard Cournot-
Walras model (Gabszewicz and Vial 1972), ﬁrms do not maximize proﬁts,
but rather choose production plans that are non-dominated from the point
of view of their shareholders, taking as given the choices of other ﬁrms, but
internalizing the eﬀect of its own choice on the equilibrium market prices.
We call such equilibria Cournot 푆-eﬃcient equilibria (or simply Cournot
푆-equilibria). The term hints to the fact that such a production plan is
eﬃcient from the point of view of the shareholders who, while price takers as
consumers, are aware of the market power of the ﬁrms they own. Cournot 푆-
eﬃcient equilibria are typically diﬀerent from the standard Cournot-Walras
equilibria due to price eﬀects on shareholders’ wealth.
Without loss of generality, we normalize prices to lie in the unit simplex.2
Given a choice of a production plan (−훼, 훼), in the resulting competitive ex-
change equilibrium, (normalized) prices are
(
6+훼
14
, 8−훼
14
)
, and ﬁrst consumer’s
utility is 푣(훼) = 2 ln(28 + 훼(1 − 훼)) − ln(6 + 훼) − ln(8 − 훼). As the sole
owner of the ﬁrm, consumer 1 would want the ﬁrm to choose a production
plan (−훼∗, 훼∗) with 훼∗ ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes his utility (which is strictly
concave in 훼). The ﬁrst order conditions show that 훼∗ is the unique solution
of the equation 훼3−3훼2−67훼+20 = 0 that belongs to [0, 1], hence 훼∗ ≈ 0.3.
Hence, the unique equilibrium of the prototype economy in which the ﬁrm
acts strategically in the market but follows an objective that is consistent
with its owner’s interests corresponds to a production vector (−훼∗, 훼∗) ≈
(−0.3, 0.3) and the equilibrium prices (6+훼∗
14
, 8−훼
∗
14
) ≈ (0.45, 0.55).
To study the limit behavior of Cournot 푆-equilibria we construct se-
quences of replica economies, in the spirit of Debreu and Scarf (1963). An
푛-fold replica of ℰ1, denoted ℰ푛, is an economy with 2푛 consumers and 푛
ﬁrms. All ﬁrms, indexed by 푗 ∈ {1, ..., 푛}, have the same production set as
2Our results are independent of this normalization since the objective of each ﬁrm
is formulated in terms of shareholders’ indirect utilities, which only depend on relative
equilibrium prices and thus are immune to the normalization chosen.
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the ﬁrm of the prototype economy. Consumers are indexed by (푖, 푘) with
푖 ∈ {1, 2} and 푘 ∈ {1, .., 푛}. We will refer to 푖 as the type and to 푘 as
the name of the consumer (푖, 푘). Every consumer of type 푖 has the same
preferences and endowment of goods as consumer 푖 of the prototype econ-
omy. Similarly, a continuum replica, (also called the limit replica) ℰ∞, is an
economy with a continuum of identical ﬁrms and consumers of each type.
Due to log-utilities, the exchange equilibrium prices following a choice of
production plans by the ﬁrms in any of these replicas do not depend on the
way shares are distributed across consumers. For the 푛-fold replica economy,
given a production plan 푦 = ((−훼푗, 훼푗))푛푗=1, let
휅(푦) :=
1
푛
푛∑
푗=1
훼푗. (2.1)
Simple computations reveal that the unique exchange equilibrium price vec-
tor following the choice of production plan 푦 is
(
6+휅(푦)
14
, 8−휅(푦)
14
)
. The same
formula is valid in the continuum replica economy ℰ∞, with a proper rein-
terpretation of 휅, i.e.,
휅(푦) :=
∫
[0,1]
훼(푗)푑휆(푗), (2.2)
where 휆 is the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]. For a continuum replica, a feasible
production plan is a Lebesque measurable function 푦 : [0, 1]→ 푌 .
Cournot 푆-equilibrium production plans of the 푛-fold replica economy
depend on the ownership structure, which is the deciding factor in whether
Cournot 푆-equilibria of large economies become close to Walrasian equilibria
of the limit economy ℰ∞. There are various ways to replicate the ownership of
ﬁrms’ shares. We will outline here two diﬀerent types of ownership structures,
and show that they bear very diﬀerent implications on the issue whether
Cournot 푆-equilibrium allocations approach the competitive allocations of
the limit economy.
1. Concentrated ownership replication. In this replication, every
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consumer of type 1 is the sole owner of the ﬁrm with the same name
(i.e., consumer (1, 푗) is the sole owner of ﬁrm 푗), and all consumers
of type 2 have no ﬁrm ownership. We denote (ﬁnite and continuum)
replicas bearing this ownership structure by ℰ푐푛 and ℰ푐∞.
Following a choice 푦 = ((−훼푗, 훼푗))푛푗=1 ∈ ℝ퐿푛 of production plans by
the ﬁrms, the wealth and utility of consumer (1, 푗) in such replica are
given by:
푤(휅(푦), 훼푗) =
1
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(28 + 훼푗(1− 휅(푦))) , (2.3)
푉 (휅(푦), 훼푗) = 2 ln (28 + 훼푗(1− 휅(푦)))− ln[(6 + 휅(푦))(8− 휅(푦)]).
(2.4)
Thus, in accordance with its owner’s preferences, each ﬁrm chooses
훼 ∈ [0, 1] to maximize 푉 (휅, 훼). Since the problem has a unique solution,
Cournot 푆-equilibria of the economy ℰ푐푛 must be symmetric, i.e., 훼푗 = 휅
for 푗 = 1, .., 푛. The ﬁrst order condition implies that 휅 satisﬁes
2휅− 2
휅2 − 휅− 28 =
1
푛
(
1
휅− 8 +
1
휅+ 6
− 2휅
휅2 − 휅− 28
)
(2.5)
According to the implicit function theorem, the solution of (2.5), de-
noted 휅(1/푛), is a continuous function of 1/푛, hence when 푛 → ∞,
휅(1/푛) converges to the solution of (2휅− 2)/(휅2 − 휅− 28) = 0, which
is 휅∗ = 1. This corresponds to every ﬁrm choosing the competitive
production plan. Thus, the sequence of Cournot 푆-eﬃcient equilibria
of ℰ푐푛 converges to the Walrasian equilibrium of ℰ푐∞.
2. Diﬀuse ownership replication. In this replication, every ﬁrm is
equally owned by all consumers of type 1, while consumers of type 2
still have no ownership. The ﬁnite 푛-fold replica will be denoted by ℰ푑푛,
while the continuum replica will be denoted by ℰ푑∞.
Since each ﬁrm in ℰ푑푛 is owned by 푛 identical consumers, at a Cournot
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푆-equilibrium, ﬁrms maximize the utility of their representative owner.
The wealth and utility of consumer (1, 푗) in ℰ푑푛 depend only on the
average production, 휅(푦), and have the same expressions as (2.3),(2.4)
with 훼푗 replaced by 휅(푦). Thus owners of each ﬁrm are identical in
terms of preferences and wealth, and therefore ﬁnding 푆-eﬃcient allo-
cations amounts to maximizing the utility of the representative con-
sumer, which reduces to the case analyzed for the prototype economy.
Hence a production plan 푦푛 is a Cournot 푆-equilibrium plan if and only
if it satisﬁes 휅(푦푛) = 훼
∗ ≈ 0.3. In particular, the production plan 푦∗푛
in which all ﬁrms choose (−훼∗, 훼∗) is a Cournot 푆-equilibrium. Hence,
the monopolistic choice persists in arbitrarily large economies.
Note that every consumer of type 1 has the same total ownership of
shares in the two examples. In the concentrated ownership example, each
consumer remains the sole owner of a ﬁrm, irrespective of the size of the
economy. Thus, as the economy grows larger, that ﬁrm’s production choice
essentially aﬀects its owner’s budget constraint and thus the income eﬀect
of a ﬁrm’s production choice persists in arbitrarily large economies. On the
other hand, price eﬀects vanish and will be dominated by the income eﬀect,
and thus every type 1 consumer would want his ﬁrm to choose a production
plan close to the proﬁt maximizing plan at the limit competitive price. By
contrast, in the diﬀuse ownership example, a type 1 consumer’s ownership in
any ﬁrm diminishes, as the economy grows larger. Thus, the income eﬀect
of a ﬁrm’s choice vanishes and shareholders tend to be indiﬀerent among
that ﬁrm’s feasible production plans. This is the mechanism through which
a monopolistic equilibrium can persist in arbitrarily large economies.
It should also be noted that what drives the results is ﬁrms’ behavior:
i.e., their choice of production plans in accordance with their shareholders’
interests. Whether a ﬁrm’s shareholders’ interests are aligned (as in this
example) or not (as in the main theorem or the example of Section 5) is
inconsequential.
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3 Finite-type production economies
Let ℐ = {1, ..., 퐼} be the set of consumers’ types and 풥 = {1, ..., 퐽} be the set
of ﬁrms’ types. For every 푗 ∈ 풥 let 푌푗 ⊆ ℝ퐿 be the production set of a type-푗
ﬁrm. 푌푗 is assumed to satisfy the following standard conditions: (a) 푌푗 is
closed, convex and contains the origin and (b) 푌푗∩ℝ퐿+ = {0} (i.e., 푌푗 excludes
“free lunches”). For every 푖 ∈ ℐ, let (ℝ퐿+, 푢푖, 푒푖) be the characteristics of a
type-푖 consumer, where ℝ퐿+ is the consumption set, 푢푖 : ℝ퐿+ → ℝ a utility
representation of his preferences, and 푒푖 ∈ ℝ퐿++ the endowment of goods. It is
assumed that the utility functions 푢푖 are continuous, monotonic and strictly
quasi-concave.
The space of ﬁrms is (Ω퐹 ,풢), where Ω퐹 = 풥 × [0, 1] and 풢 is a ﬁnite
or countably generated 휎-algebra on Ω퐹 such that 2
풥 × [0, 1] ⊂ 풢; thus the
projection 횥 of Ω퐹 on 풥 , deﬁned as 횥((푗, 푎)) = 푗, for all (푗, 푎) ∈ Ω퐹 , is
measurable. A ﬁrm is an atom of the 휎-algebra 풢.3 For every 푡 ∈ Ω퐹 , the
unique atom that contains 푡 is denoted by 풢(푡), and is called ﬁrm 풢(푡), or
simply ﬁrm 푡, when no confusion can arise.4 Since 2풥 × [0, 1] ⊆ 풢, every
atom’s projection on 풥 must be a singleton, and therefore any ﬁrm 풢(푡) can
be written as a pair (푗, 퐴) for some 푗 ∈ 풥 and 퐴 ⊂ [0, 1]. We will refer to
푗 = 횥(푡) as the type of ﬁrm 푡.
The consumers’ side of the economy is represented by the probability
space (Ω퐶 ,ℱ , 휇퐶), where Ω퐶 = ℐ × [0, 1], ℱ is a 휎-algebra on Ω퐶 and 휇퐶
is a probability measure on ℱ . We assume that 2ℐ × [0, 1] ⊂ ℱ , hence
the projection function 횤 of Ω퐶 on ℐ is measurable. We assume that either
(Ω퐶 ,ℱ) is a Polish space,5 or that ℱ is ﬁnite. A consumer is an atom of
the 휎-algebra ℱ . For every 푠 ∈ Ω퐶 , the unique atom that contains 푠 will be
3A non-empty set 퐵 is called an atom of the 휎-algebra 풢 if and only if 퐵 ∈ 풢 and for
all 퐶 ∈ 풢, either 퐵 ⊆ 퐶 or 퐵 ∩ 퐶 = ∅ (Dudley 2002, p.87).
4 Since 풢 is countably generated, the atoms of 풢 form a partition of Ω퐹 , and the atom
풢(푡) equals the intersection of all sets in 풢 containing 푡 (see Appendix A for details).
5The space (Ω퐶 ,ℱ) is Polish if ℱ is the Borel 휎-algebra generated by a topology on
Ω퐶 induced by a complete and separable metric.
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denoted by ℱ(푠) and referred to as consumer ℱ(푠), or simply as consumer
푠 by an abuse of notation.6 The type of consumer ℱ(푠) is 횤(푠) ∈ ℐ. The
relative size of type-푖 consumers to the size of the economy is 휇퐶({푖}× [0, 1]).
The ownership structure of the economy is described by a measure kernel
휃 : Ω퐶 × 풢 → ℝ+. Thus, for all 푠 ∈ Ω퐶 , 휃(푠, ⋅) is a ﬁnite measure on 풢
(interpreted as consumer 푠’s allocation of shares across ﬁrms) and, for every
퐵 ∈ 풢, the map 휃(⋅, 퐵) is ℱ -measurable. For every 푠 ∈ Ω퐶 , 휃(푠,Ω퐹 ) repre-
sents the total “number” of shares (in various ﬁrms) owned by consumer 푠.
We assume that 휃(⋅,Ω퐹 ) is bounded. Note that this deﬁnition allows con-
sumers of the same type to have diﬀerent endowments of shares. Therefore,
consumers of the same type are identical only in terms of their preferences
and endowments of goods.
Let 휇퐶 ⊗ 휃 be the measure on ℱ ⊗ 풢 (Kallenberg 2002, p.21) deﬁned by
(휇퐶 ⊗ 휃)(퐵) :=
∫
Ω퐶
∫
Ω퐹
1퐵(푠, 푡)휃(푠, 푑푡)휇퐶(푑푠), 퐵 ∈ ℱ ⊗ 풢, (3.1)
where 1퐵 denotes the indicator function of set 퐵.
7 Since 휃(⋅,Ω퐹 ) is bounded,
휇퐶 ⊗ 휃 is a ﬁnite measure. The composition 휇퐶휃 of 휇퐶 and the kernel 휃
(Kallenberg 2002, p.22) deﬁnes a measure 휇퐹 := 휇퐶휃 on the the space of
ﬁrms, given by
휇퐹 (푇 ) :=
∫
Ω퐶
휃(푠, 푇 )휇퐶(푑푠), 푇 ∈ 풢. (3.2)
Notice that 휇퐹 (⋅) = (휇퐶 ⊗ 휃)(Ω퐶 × ⋅) and thus 휇퐹 is also a ﬁnite measure.
Hence, there exists a probability kernel8 훾 : Ω퐹 × ℱ → [0, 1], such that:
(i) for every 푡 ∈ Ω퐹 , 훾(푡, ⋅) is a probability measure on ℱ , (ii) for every
6The Polish space assumption imposed on (Ω퐶 ,ℱ) implies that ℱ is countably gener-
ated, and hence the results of Appendix A apply. See also footnote 4.
7The indicator function 1퐵 is deﬁned as 1퐵(푥) =
{
1 if 푥 ∈ 퐵,
0 if 푥 /∈ 퐵 .
8See the Appendix B for a proof.
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푆 ∈ ℱ , 훾(⋅, 푆) is 풢-measurable, and (iii) for any 푔 : Ω퐶 × Ω퐹 → ℝ which is
ℱ ⊗ 풢-measurable and 휇퐶 ⊗ 휃-integrable,∫
Ω퐹
[∫
Ω퐶
푔(푠, 푡)훾(푡, 푑푠)
]
휇퐹 (푑푡) =
∫
Ω퐶×Ω퐹
푔 푑(휇퐶 ⊗ 휃)
=
∫
Ω퐶
[∫
Ω퐹
푔(푠, 푡)휃(푠, 푑푡)
]
휇퐶(푑푠) (3.3)
For every 푡 ∈ Ω퐹 , the probability 훾(푡, ⋅) represents ﬁrm 푡’s distribution of
shares across consumers.
The probability space of consumers (Ω퐶 ,ℱ , 휇퐶), together with the mea-
surable space of ﬁrms (Ω퐹 ,풢) and an ownership structure described by the
kernel 휃 from Ω퐶 to Ω퐹 deﬁnes a private ownership production economy ℰ ,
ℰ = ((Ω퐶 ,ℱ , 휇퐶); (Ω퐹 ,풢); 휃) .
A ﬁnite economy is an economy for which the 휎-algebras ℱ and 풢 are ﬁnite.
An atomless economy is an economy for which the measure 휇퐹 is atomless.
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Equation (3.2) implies that 휇퐹 is atomless if and only if for every 푡 ∈ Ω퐹 ,
휃(푠,풢(푡)) = 0 for 휇퐶-a.e. 푠 ∈ Ω퐶 .10
The prototypical Arrow-Debreu production economy with 퐼 consumers
and 퐽 ﬁrms, in which the 푖-th consumer owns 푠(푖, 푗) shares of 푗-th ﬁrm can
be represented as an economy ℰ1 = ((Ω퐶 ,ℱ1, 휇퐶), (Ω퐹 ,풢1), 휃1) with ℱ1 :=
2ℐ × [0, 1], 풢1 := 2풥 × [0, 1], 휇퐶 = 휆ℐ ⊗ 휆, and 휃({푖} × [0, 1]), {푗} × [0, 1])) =
푠(푖, 푗), with 휆ℐ being the uniform probability on ℐ (i.e. 휆ℐ(푖) = 1/퐼, ∀푖 ∈
ℐ) and 휆 being the Lebesque measure on [0, 1]. Thus we identify the 푖-th
consumer, respectively the 푗-th ﬁrm of the Arrow-Debreu economy with the
atom {푖} × [0, 1] of ℱ1, respectively the atom {푗} × [0, 1] of 풢1.
Using sequences of replica economies to draw inferences about (strategic)
9The measure 휇퐹 on (Ω퐹 ,풢) is atomless, or nonatomic, if 풢 has no 휇퐹 -nonnull atoms
(Dudley 2002, p.82).
10Throughout the paper, “a.e.” means “almost every(where)” and “a.s.” means “almost
surely”.
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equilibrium behavior in large economies is a technique introduced by De-
breu and Scarf (1963), for pure exchange economies, and also widely used in
the literature for economies with production. An 푛-fold replica consists of
푛 “clones” of each ﬁrm and each consumer of the prototype Arrow-Debreu
economy. There are many ways to assign ownership of ﬁrms across consumers
in replica economies. For example, a replica may be constructed such that
each clone of a certain type holds the same number of shares in ﬁrms of the
same industry (type); in the example of Section 2 we referred to this owner-
ship structure as a “diﬀuse ownership” replication. This approach is advo-
cated by Gabszewicz and Vial (1972), Roberts (1980), Mas-Colell (1982), and
Allen (1994), among others. However this is not the only way one can con-
struct replicas of a particular economy, even when similarity of the clones is
a concern. Aliprantis, Brown, and Burkinshaw (1987), and Florenzano and
Mercato (2004) assume that each clone of the prototype economy inherits
the initial ownership structure. In this “concentrated ownership” replication
(see Section 2), a clone of a consumer of type 푖 owns 푠(푖, 푗) shares of the
corresponding clone of ﬁrm 푗. The name captures the idea that ownership
is segmented across the clones of the prototype economy, rather than being
spread across multiple clones.
We can embed replicas with arbitrary ownership structure in our frame-
work. For every 푛 ∈ ℕ, let 퐻1푛 := [0, 1/푛] and for 푘 ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 푛}, let
퐻푘푛 :=
(
푘−1
푛
, 푘
푛
]
. Denote by ℋ푛 the algebra generated by {퐻1푛, . . . , 퐻푛푛}. For
each 푎 ∈ [0, 1], let 푘(푎) := {푘 : 푎 ∈ 퐻푘푛} and ℋ푛(푎) := 퐻푘(푎)푛 . Deﬁne
ℱ푛 := 2ℐ ⊗ℋ푛, 풢푛 := 2풥 ⊗ℋ푛 and 휇푛퐶 := 휆ℐ ⊗휆. Thus consumers and ﬁrms
in the 푛-fold replica are pairs of the form (푖,퐻푘푛) and, respectively, (푗,퐻
푘
푛),
with 푘 = 1, ..., 푛. By an abuse of notation we will often identify a point
푎 ∈ [0, 1] with the interval ℋ푛(푎) and thus represent consumers and ﬁrms as
pairs (푖, 푎) and respectively (푗, 푎). We will refer to the ﬁrst component of such
pair as the “type” and to the second as the “name” of the consumer/ﬁrm.
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The concentrated ownership 푛-fold replica can be modeled as an economy
ℰ푐푛 :=
(
(Ω퐶 , 2
ℐ ⊗ℋ푛, 휆ℐ ⊗ 휆); (Ω퐹 , 2풥 ⊗ℋ푛); 휃푐푛
)
, (3.4)
where, by letting 훿푎(퐴) := 1퐴(푎),
휃푐푛((푖, 푎), (푗, 퐴)) = 푠(푖, 푗) ⋅ 훿푎(퐴),∀(푖, 푎) ∈ Ω퐶 ,∀(푗, 퐴) ∈ 2풥 ⊗ℋ푛. (3.5)
The diﬀuse ownership 푛-fold replica can be described as the economy
ℰ푑푛 :=
(
(Ω퐶 , 2
ℐ ⊗ℋ푛, 휆ℐ ⊗ 휆); (Ω퐹 , 2풥 ⊗ℋ푛); 휃푑푛
)
, (3.6)
with
휃푑푛((푖, 푎), (푗, 퐴)) = 푠(푖, 푗) ⋅ 휆(퐴),∀(푖, 푎) ∈ Ω퐶 ,∀(푗, 퐴) ∈ 풢푛. (3.7)
Note that for every consumer (푖, 푎) the total number of shares owned by
(푖, 푎) is the same in the concentrated ownership and diﬀuse replica economies
ℰ푐푛, ℰ푑푛. Thus, the total mass of the ownership distribution of a consumer stays
the same. However, under the diﬀuse ownership speciﬁcation, the support of
the distribution becomes larger as the size of the economy increases.
Intuitively, the sequence of economies (ℰ푐푛) “converges” to the atomless
economy
ℰ푐 := ((Ω퐶 , 2ℐ ⊗ ℬ[0, 1], 휆ℐ ⊗ 휆); (Ω퐹 , 2풥 ⊗ ℬ[0, 1]); 휃푐) , (3.8)
where 휃푐((푖, 푎), (푗, 퐴)) = 푠(푖, 푗) ⋅ 훿푎(퐴), for any 퐴 ∈ ℬ([0, 1]), and ℬ([0, 1])
is the Borel 휎-algebra on [0, 1]. Similarly, the sequence of economies (ℰ푑푛)
“converges” to the atomless economy
ℰ푑 := ((Ω퐶 , 2ℐ ⊗ ℬ[0, 1], 휆ℐ ⊗ 휆); (Ω퐹 , 2풥 ⊗ ℬ[0, 1]); 휃푑) , (3.9)
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where 휃푑((푖, 푎), (푗, 퐴)) = 푠(푖, 푗) ⋅ 휆(퐴), for any 퐴 ∈ ℬ([0, 1]). We formalize
the notion of convergence for a sequence of ﬁnite economies in Section 5.
4 Cournot 푆-equilibrium
This section deﬁnes our notion of equilibrium for production economies in
which consumers are price takers when making their consumption decisions,
and ﬁrms interact strategically via a Cournot-type quantity competition but,
rather than maximizing proﬁts, they follow an objective that is consistent
with their shareholders’ interests. We call this new concept a Cournot 푆-
equilibrium.
To simplify exposition, we make no distinction here between the con-
sumers who own the ﬁrm and those who control it. However all our results
remain true if we assume that a ﬁrm’s decisions are controlled by a (prede-
termined) group of consumers (e.g., the Board of Directors).
Consider a production economy ℰ = ((Ω퐶 ,ℱ , 휇퐶); (Ω퐹 ,풢); 휃). An allo-
cation for the economy ℰ is a pair (푐, 푦), such that 푐 : Ω퐶 → ℝ퐿+ is ℱ -
measurable, 푦 : Ω퐹 → ℝ퐿 is 풢-measurable and 휃(푠, ⋅)-integrable for 휇퐶-
almost all 푠 ∈ Ω퐶 , and 푦(푗, 푎) ∈ 푌푗 for all (푗, 푎) ∈ Ω퐹 . Hence for any 푠 ∈ Ω퐶
and 푡 ∈ Ω퐹 , 푐(푠) represents the consumption bundle of agent 푠, and 푦(푡)
is the production per outstanding share of ﬁrm 푡. We call 푐 a consumption
allocation and 푦 a production plan for the economy ℰ . The allocation (푐, 푦)
is called feasible if ∫
Ω퐶
푐 푑휇퐶 =
∫
Ω퐶
푒 푑휇퐶 +
∫
Ω퐹
푦 푑휇퐹 ,
where 푒(푠) := 푒횤(푠), 푠 ∈ Ω퐶 and 휇퐹 = 휇퐶휃. A given production plan 푦
generates the intermediate endowment mapping 푤푦 : Ω퐶 → ℝ퐿 deﬁned by
푤푦(푠) := 푒(푠) +
∫
Ω퐹
푦(푡)휃(푠, 푑푡), 푠 ∈ Ω퐶 . (4.1)
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Note that (3.3) implies that 푤푦 is 휇퐶-integrable and∫
Ω퐶
푤푦 푑휇퐶 =
∫
Ω퐶
푒 푑휇퐶 +
∫
Ω퐹
푦 푑휇퐹 .
When the market price vector is 푝 ∈ Δ퐿−1 (with Δ퐿−1 denoting the unit
simplex in ℝ퐿+), the budget constraint of a consumer 푠 ∈ Ω퐶 is {푥 ∈ ℝ퐿+∣푝⋅푥 ≤
푝 ⋅ 푤푦(푠)} and his consumption choice is 퐷횤(푠)(푝, 푤푦(푠)), where
퐷푖(푝, 푧) := arg max{푢푖(푥) ∣ 푥 ∈ ℝ퐿+, 푝푥 ≤ 푝푧}, 푖 ∈ ℐ, 푝 ∈ Δ퐿−1, 푧 ∈ ℝ퐿+.
The utility of consumer 푠 at his optimal consumption choice, when faced
with prices 푝 and a production plan 푦, is 푉 횤(푠)(푝, 푤푦(푠)), where 푉
푖(푝, 푧) :=
푢푖 (퐷푖(푝, 푧)) , 푖 ∈ ℐ, 푝 ∈ Δ퐿−1, 푧 ∈ ℝ퐿+.
For any production plan 푦, denote by ℰ(푦) the associated pure-exchange
economy in which consumers’ endowments are given by 푤푦. The set of Wal-
rasian equilibrium prices of the economy ℰ(푦) depends only on the distri-
bution of intermediate endowments across types deﬁned as 휇퐶 ∘ 푤˜−1푦 , where
푤˜푦 : Ω퐶 → ℐ × ℝ퐿+, 푤˜푦(푠) := (횤(푠), 푤푦(푠)). Even stronger, if the distribution
of intermediate endowments across types for two diﬀerent economies ℰ(푦)
and ℰ ′(푦′) coincide, then the sets of Walrasian equilibrium prices for ℰ(푦)
and ℰ ′(푦′) are identical (Hildenbrand 1970). Let 푃 (휇퐶 ∘ 푤˜−1푦 ) ⊆ Δ퐿−1 be the
set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors of ℰ(푦). For convenience, we will
let 푃 (푦) := 푃 (휇퐶 ∘ 푤˜−1푦 ).
For some production sets, in particular for those that exhibit free disposal,
the economy ℰ푦 may have no Walrasian equilibrium. Certain lower bounds,
or capacity constraints, need to be imposed on the ﬁrms’ strategy sets to
avoid this occurrence and make the problem meaningful. It is suﬃcient, for
example to restrict ﬁrms’ choices to production plans that generate positive
intermediate endowments.11 For such production plans, the main theorem in
11This happens, for example, if each production set is contained in the set {푦 ∈ ℝ퐿∣푦푙 ≥
−min푖∈ℐ 푒푖푙푀 ,∀푙 = 1, . . . , 퐿}, where 푀 is the upper bound on the kernels 휃.
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McKenzie (1981) implies that 푃 (⋅) is not empty-valued. However, positivity
of intermediate endowments is not necessary for the existence of a Walrasian
equilibrium in the associated pure-exchange economy and therefore a much
larger set than the one described above may still generate non-empty val-
ues for 푃 . For the remaining of the paper we are going to abstract from
the diﬃculties posed by the possible empty-values of 푃 by assuming that
the production sets (푌푗)푗∈풥 contain some capacity constraints that are tight
enough to guarantee the existence of a competitive equilibrium for every pro-
duction plan 푦.12 In particular, we assume that the production sets (푌푗)푗∈풥
are bounded, hence compact. Since the correspondence 푃 is closed, has com-
pact values,13 and it is deﬁned on a compact space,14 푃 is weakly measurable
and thus, according to Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski theorem (Aliprantis and
Border 1999, Theorem 14.86) it has a measurable selection p (i.e., p is mea-
surable and p(푦) ∈ 푃 (푦)).
A pair (푝¯, 푦¯) of prices 푝¯ ∈ Δ퐿−1 and production plan 푦¯ is a Walrasian
equilibrium for the economy ℰ if and only if 푝¯ ∈ 푃 (푦¯) and, for 휇퐹 -almost
every 푡 ∈ Ω퐹 ,
푝¯ ⋅ 푦¯(푡) = max
푧∈푌횥(푡)
푝¯ ⋅ 푧.
We introduce next the concept of a Cournot 푆-equilibrium, which captures
the idea that, although an individual consumer cannot aﬀect market prices
through his consumption decisions, he is aware of the eﬀect that a ﬁrm that
he owns has on market prices.
12One can dispense of this assumption by restricting the ﬁrms’ strategy sets to a subset
on which existence of a competitive equilibrium is guaranteed. With due care, all the re-
sults of this paper can be derived under such restriction, but the details of the construction
are beyond the scope of this paper.
13The standard reference is Hildenbrand and Mertens (1972). However, in our case an
extension of the classical result is needed since the intermediate endowments may generate
zero wealth (see, for example, Bejan 2008).
14Note that intermediate endowments must lie in a compact subset of ℝ퐿, since the set
of feasible production plans is bounded. The space of laws on ℝ퐿 with support in a given
compact is compact, when endowed with the weak convergence topology (Dudley 2002,
Theorem 9.3.3).
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Deﬁnition 4.1. A production plan 푦∗ is called 푆-eﬃcient for ﬁrm 푡 = (푗, 푎),
given the measurable price selection p from 푃 if and only if there does not
exist 푧 ∈ 푌푗 such that:
훾
(
푡,
{
푠 ∣ 푉 횤(푠)(p(푦˜), 푤푦˜) ≥ 푉 횤(푠)(p(푦∗), 푤푦∗)
})
= 1, (4.2)
훾
(
푡,
{
푠 ∣ 푉 횤(푠)(p(푦˜), 푤푦˜) ≥ 푉 횤(푠)(p(푦∗), 푤푦∗)
})
> 0,
where 푦˜ : Ω퐹 → ℝ퐿 is deﬁned as 푦˜ := 푦∗ + (푧 − 푦∗)1풢(푡) and 1풢(푡) is the
indicator function of the set 풢(푡). A pair (p, 푦∗) consisting of a measurable
selection p from 푃 and a production plan 푦∗ is called a Cournot 푆-equilibrium
if, given the selection p, 푦∗ is 푆-eﬃcient for 휇퐹 -almost every 푡 ∈ Ω퐹 .
We will simply refer to a production plan 푦∗ as being a Cournot 푆-
equilibrium whenever there exists a measurable price selection p such that
(p, 푦∗) is a Cournot 푆-equilibrium. Thus for a ﬁxed price selection, a pro-
duction plan is 푆-eﬃcient for a ﬁrm if, given the choices of the other ﬁrms,
there does not exist another production plan such that every shareholder of
the ﬁrm is better oﬀ in the new market equilibrium. It is important to note
here that 푆-eﬃciency is a very weak condition, since diﬀerent production
choices made by a ﬁrm may generate equilibrium allocations for that ﬁrm’s
shareholders which are not Pareto comparable. It is therefore likely that the
set of Cournot 푆-equilibria is large. Our example in section 5 supports this
hypothesis.
We examine ﬁrst the relationship between Walrasian equilibria and Cournot
푆-equilibria in atomless economies. We start by showing that a measure zero
of ﬁrms cannot aﬀect the equilibrium price in atomless economies. Since
every single ﬁrm (atom) is of measure zero in an atomless economy, an indi-
vidual ﬁrm’s change in production has a negligible price eﬀect.
Lemma 4.2. Let ℰ = ((Ω퐶 ,ℱ , 휇퐶); (Ω퐹 ,풢); 휃) be an atomless economy, and
assume the production plans 푦, 푦′ : Ω퐹 → ℝ퐿 are equal 휇퐹 -a.e, where 휇퐹 =
휇퐶휃. Then 푃 (푦) = 푃 (푦
′).
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Proof. Since 휇퐹 ({푦 ∕= 푦′}) = 0, for any set 푆 ∈ ℱ of consumers, (3.3) implies∫
푆
[∫
Ω퐹
푦(푡)휃(푠, 푑푡)
]
휇퐶(푑푠) =
∫
Ω퐹
푦(푡)훾(푡, 푆)휇퐹 (푑푡)
=
∫
Ω퐹
푦′(푡)훾(푡, 푆)휇퐹 (푑푡)
=
∫
푆
[∫
Ω퐹
푦′(푡)휃(푠, 푑푡)
]
휇퐶(푑푠).
Thus the intermediate endowments associated to the two production plans
coincide 휇퐶-a.e., and therefore the sets of equilibrium prices associated to
the two production plans coincide.
In atomless economies, a Walrasian equilibrium is also a Cournot 푆-
equilibrium, but the choice of an 푆-eﬃcient production plan may not neces-
sarily lead to proﬁt maximization (at the Walrasian prices) for some owner-
ship structures.
Proposition 4.3. Let ℰ = ((Ω퐶 ,ℱ , 휇퐶); (Ω퐹 ,풢); 휃) be an atomless economy.
1. If (푝¯, 푦¯) is a Walrasian equilibrium for ℰ, then (p¯, 푦¯) is a Cournot 푆-
equilibrium for ℰ, where p¯ is any price selection such that p¯(푦¯) = 푝¯.
2. If (p¯, 푦¯) is a Cournot 푆-equilibrium for ℰ, then 푦¯ is proﬁt maximizing
at prices p¯(푦¯) on the set of ﬁrms Ω푚푎푥퐹 deﬁned by
Ω푚푎푥퐹 := {푡 ∣ 훾 (푡, {푠 ∣ 휃(푠,풢(푡)) > 0}) > 0} . (4.3)
Moreover,
(
푝¯, 푦¯1Ω푚푎푥퐹 + 푦1Ω퐹 ∖Ω푚푎푥퐹
)
is a Cournot 푆-equilibrium, for any
production plan 푦.
Proof. 1. By Lemma 4.2, any deviation from 푦¯ by a single ﬁrm will leave the
price 푝¯ unchanged, and the best choice of a production plan for each ﬁrm,
from the perspective of its shareholders, is a proﬁt maximizing plan. Hence
the conclusion follows.
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2. Using Lemma 4.2 and Deﬁnition 4.1, it follows that (p¯, 푦¯) is a Cournot
푆-equilibrium if and only if for every ﬁrm 푡, the set of its shareholders whose
wealth can be increased by a deviation to a proﬁt maximization choice is
negligible. Formally, for any 푦ˆ which is a proﬁt maximizing at prices 푝¯,
훾 (푡, {푠 ∣ (푝¯ ⋅ 푦ˆ(푡)− 푝¯ ⋅ 푦¯(푡))휃(푠,풢(푡)) > 0}) = 0, for 휇퐹 -a.e. 푡 ∈ Ω퐹 . (4.4)
Condition (4.4) requires that for 휇퐹 -a.e. 푡 ∈ Ω퐹 , either 푝¯ ⋅ 푦ˆ(푡) = 푝¯ ⋅ 푦¯(푡) or
훾 (푡, {푠 ∣ 휃(푠,풢(푡)) > 0}) = 0 (or both), and the conclusion follows.
The last part of the proposition points out that, in an atomless economy,
any production plan is 푆-eﬃcient for ﬁrms in Ω퐹 ∖Ω푚푎푥퐹 . If ℰ is atomless then,
for every 푡 ∈ Ω퐹 , {푠 ∣ 휃(푠,풢(푡)) > 0} is a 휇퐶-measure zero set. Thus any ﬁrm
푡 ∈ Ω푚푎푥퐹 has a positive share of it owned by a 휇퐶-measure zero set of con-
sumers. Note that a ﬁrm belongs to the set Ω푚푎푥퐹 if it satisﬁes two conditions.
One is to have some shareholders whose portfolios are not fully diversiﬁed
(in the sense of putting a positive mass on at least one ﬁrm and thus being
aﬀected signiﬁcantly by that ﬁrm’s proﬁts). The second requirement is that
the set of those non fully-diversiﬁed shareholders is non-negligible relative
to the set of all shareholders of the ﬁrm. These two conditions insure that
the ﬁrm’s choices have a non-negligible eﬀect on the wealth of a signiﬁcant
subset of shareholders. Because the price eﬀect is absent in an atomless
economy, those shareholders unanimously approve proﬁt maximization and
thus any Cournot 푆-eﬃcient production plan for a given ﬁrm has to be proﬁt
maximizing.
Note that Ω푚푎푥퐹 = ∅ if the measures 휃(푠, ⋅) are atomless for every 푠 ∈ Ω퐶 .
This happens, for instance, in the diﬀuse ownership economy ℰ푑 introduced
in (3.9). At the other extreme is the case of the concentrated ownership
economy ℰ푐 deﬁned in (3.8), where Ω푚푎푥퐹 = Ω퐹 and thus every Cournot
푆-equilibrium is proﬁt maximizing.
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5 Limit behavior of Cournot 푆-equilibrium
We investigate the behavior of Cournot 푆-equilibrium in large economies
and establish under what conditions Cournot-S equilibrium production plans
in a sequence of convergent economies approach proﬁt maximizing produc-
tion plans of the limit economy. First, we deﬁne a convergence notion on
the space of private ownership economies. We say that a sequence of ﬁ-
nite economies (ℰ푛 = ((Ω퐶 ,ℱ푛, 휇푛퐶); (Ω퐹 ,풢푛); 휃푛))푛∈ℕ converges to an econ-
omy ℰ = ((Ω퐶 ,ℱ , 휇퐶); (Ω퐹 ,풢); 휃) if each component in the description of ℰ푛
converges to the appropriate component of ℰ , in a sense made precise in the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 5.1. Finite economies (ℰ푛)푛∈ℕ converge to the economy ℰ if
(i) ℱ푛 ↗ ℱ and 풢푛 ↗ 풢,15
(ii) The ownership kernels 휃푛 converge to 휃, in the sense that given any
uniformly bounded sequence (푋푛) of random variables on Ω퐹 such that
푋푛 is 풢푛-measurable and, for 휇퐶-a.e. 푠 ∈ Ω퐶, 푋푛 → 푋 휃(푠, ⋅)-a.s., the
following holds∫
Ω퐹
푋푛(푡)휃푛(⋅, 푑푡)→
∫
Ω퐹
푋(푡)휃(⋅, 푑푡), 휇퐶-a.s.
(iii) 휇푛퐶 has an extension to ℱ that converges setwise to 휇퐶.16
Condition (i) requires that the sequence (ℱ푛), respectively (풢푛), asymp-
totically generates ℱ , respectively 풢. Condition (ii) is satisﬁed if, e.g., for
휇퐶-almost all 푠 ∈ Ω퐶 , the kernel 휃푛(푠, ⋅) has an extension to 풢 that converges
setwise to 휃(푠, ⋅) (Lemma C.2), and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of
15If (풜푛)푛∈ℕ,풜 are 휎-algebras on a set 퐴, then 풜푛 ↗ 풜, if and only if 풜푛 ⊂ 풜푛+1 for
all 푛 ∈ ℕ, and 풜 = 휎(∪푛∈ℕ풜푛).
16This means that there exist measures 휇˜푛퐶(⋅) on ℱ which coincide with 휇푛퐶 when re-
stricted to ℱ푛 (i.e., 휇˜푛퐶(⋅)∣ℱ푛 = 휇푛퐶(⋅)), and 휇˜푛퐶(푆) → 휇퐶(푆) for all 푆 ∈ ℱ . Lemma C.1
gives suﬃcient conditions for the existence of such extensions.
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such an extension are given in Lemma C.1. Finally, Condition (iii), in con-
junction with condition (ii) guarantees that the distribution of intermediate
endowments in the ﬁnite economies will converge to the distribution of in-
termediate endowments in the limit economy (Proposition 5.3).
The convergence notion for ﬁnite economies introduced in Deﬁnition 5.1 is
ﬂexible enough to allow any economy to be approximated by ﬁnite economies.
Notice that the ownership kernel 휃푐푛 deﬁned in equation (3.5) can be viewed
as a “conditional expectation” of the ownership kernel in the limit econ-
omy, in other words for any 푇 ∈ 2풥 ⊗ ℋ푛 and any 푠 ∈ Ω퐶 , 휃푐푛(푠, 푇 ) =
퐸휇퐶 [휃푐(⋅, 푇 )∣2풥 ⊗ℋ푛](푠). The same holds true for the 휃푑푛 deﬁned in equation
(3.7). This idea can be extended to general ownership structures.
Proposition 5.2. Consider an economy ℰ = ((Ω퐶 ,ℱ , 휇퐶); (Ω퐹 ,풢); 휃) such
that (Ω퐹 ,풢) is Polish. Let (ℱ푛)푛∈ℕ, respectively (풢푛)푛∈ℕ be ﬁnite 휎-algebras
on Ω퐶, respectively Ω퐹 , such that ℱ푛 ↗ ℱ and 풢푛 ↗ 풢. There exists a
sequence of ﬁnite economies (ℰ푛)푛∈ℕ with ℰ푛 = ((Ω퐶 ,ℱ푛, 휇퐶); (Ω퐹 ,풢푛); 휃푛)),
converging to ℰ and satisfying
휃푛(푠, 푇 ) = 퐸
휇퐶 [휃(⋅, 푇 )∣ℱ푛](푠), 휇퐶 − a.e. 푠 ∈ Ω퐶 ,∀푇 ∈ 풢. (5.1)
Proof. Proceeding as for the construction of the kernel 훾 done in Appendix
B, we show that there exists a probability kernel 휂 from Ω to 풢, such that
for all 푇 ∈ 풢, 휂(⋅, 푇 ) is ℱ푛-measurable, and
퐸휇퐶 [휃(⋅, 푇 )∣ℱ푛](푠) = 휂(푠, 푇 ) ⋅ 퐸휇퐶 [휃(⋅,Ω퐹 )∣ℱ푛](푠), 휇퐶 − a.e. 푠. (5.2)
Indeed, consider the probability space (Ω퐶 × Ω퐹 ,ℱ푛 ⊗ 풢, 휇퐶 ⊗ 휃/훼), where
휇퐶⊗휃 is deﬁned in (2.1) and 훼 = (휇퐶⊗휃)(Ω퐹 ⊗Ω퐶). Since (Ω퐹 ,풢) is Polish,
there exists a regular conditional distribution 휂 of 휋퐹 given 휋퐶 , where 휋퐹 ,
respectively 휋퐶 , are the projections of Ω퐶 × Ω퐹 on Ω퐹 , respectively on Ω퐶
(Dudley 2002, Theorem 10.2.2). Thus 휂 will be a probability kernel from
(Ω퐶 ,ℱ푛) to (Ω퐹 ,풢), such that 휂(⋅, 푇 ) is ℱ푛-measurable, for all 푇 ∈ 풢, and 휂
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satisﬁes (5.2).
Deﬁne 휃푛(푠, 푇 ) := 휂(푠, 푇 ) ⋅ 퐸휇퐶 [휃(⋅,Ω퐹 )∣ℱ푛](푠). Therefore 휃푛 satisﬁes
(5.1), and for each 푠 ∈ Ω퐶 , 휃푛(푠, ⋅) is a measure. Moreover, by construction,
휃푛(⋅, 푇 ) is ℱ푛-measurable for any 푇 ∈ 풢. Hence 휃푛 is a kernel from (Ω퐶 ,ℱ푛)
to (Ω퐹 ,풢).
Consider a sequence of random variables (푋푛)푛 with 푋푛 : Ω퐹 → ℝ being
풢푛-measurable, and let 푋, 푌 : Ω퐹 → ℝ, 풢-measurable, such that ∣푋푛∣ ≤ 푌 ,∫
Ω퐹
푌 푑휇퐹 < ∞ and 푋푛 → 푋, 휇퐶-a.s. Starting with simple functions and
then extending the argument using a monotone class theorem (Kallenberg
2002, Theorem 1.1), it follows that
푊푛(푠) :=
∫
Ω퐹
푋푛푑휃푛(푠, ⋅) = 퐸휇퐶
[∫
Ω퐹
푋푛푑휃(푠
′, ⋅)∣ℱ푛
]
(푠). (5.3)
By Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem, the sequence of functions
푓푛(푠
′) :=
∫
Ω퐹
푋푛푑휃(푠
′, ⋅) converges pointwise to 푊 (푠′) := ∫
Ω퐹
푋푑휃(푠′, ⋅).
Using an extension of the martingale convergence theorem due to Hunt
(Kopp 1984, Theorem 2.8.5), it follows that 푊푛 → 푊 , 휇퐶-a.s. Thus we
proved that indeed 휃푛 converges to 휃 in the sense of Deﬁnition 5.1.
Notice that, by the martingale convergence theorem, (5.1) implies that
for all 푇 ∈ 풢, 휃푛(⋅, 푇 )→ 휃(⋅, 푇 ), 휇퐶-a.e. However the set of 휇퐶-measure zero
where the convergence might fail depends on 푇 , and thus the set of 푠 where
휃(푠, 푇 ) does not converge to 휃(푠, 푇 ) for a 푇 ∈ 풢 might be large, even cover
the whole Ω퐶 . Thus it might not be true that, for 휇퐶-a.e. 푠 ∈ Ω퐶 , 휃푛(푠, ⋅)
converges setwise to 휃(푠, ⋅).
For a general sequence of convergent economies as in Deﬁnition 5.1 and
a sequence of convergent production plans, we show that the distribution of
intermediate endowments across types converges.
Proposition 5.3. Let (ℰ푛 = ((Ω퐶 ,ℱ푛, 휇푛퐶); (Ω퐹 ,풢푛); 휃푛))푛∈ℕ be a sequence
of ﬁnite economies converging to an economy ℰ = ((Ω퐶 ,ℱ , 휇퐶); (Ω퐹 ,풢); 휃).
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Let 푦푛 be a production plan in ℰ푛 and 푦 a production plan in ℰ. If 푦푛 → 푦,
휇퐹 -a.s., where 휇퐹 = 휇퐶휃, then 휇
푛
퐶 ∘ 푤˜−1푦푛 converges weakly to 휇퐶 ∘ 푤˜−1푦 .
Proof. Using equation (3.3), for any 푇 ∈ ℬ(Ω퐹 ), with 휇퐹 (푇 ) = 0 it follows
that 휃(푠, 푇 ) = 0 for 휇퐶-a.e. 푠 ∈ Ω퐶 . Thus the fact that 푦푛 → 푦 휇퐹 -a.s.
implies that, for 휇퐶-a.e. 푠 ∈ Ω퐶 , 푦푛 → 푦, 휃(푠, ⋅)-a.s. Since 휃푛 converges
to 휃, it follows that 푤푦푛 → 푤푦, 휇퐶-a.s. (see Deﬁnition 5.1,(ii)). For any
푔 : ℐ×ℝ퐿 → ℝ continuous and bounded, Lemma C.2 applied to the sequence
휇푛퐶 having extensions converging setwise to 휇퐶 gives∫
ℐ×ℝ퐿
푔 푑휇푛퐶 ∘ 푤˜−1푦푛 =
∫
Ω퐶
푔 ∘ 푤˜푦푛 푑휇푛퐶 →
∫
Ω퐶
푔 ∘ 푤˜푦 푑휇퐶 =
∫
ℐ×ℝ퐿
푔 푑휇퐶 ∘ 푤˜−1푦 .
(5.4)
Thus the convergence of the distribution of intermediate endowments across
types is established.
Given an economy ℰ and 휀 > 0, we denote the set of ﬁrms for which
almost every shareholder owns more than 휀 shares by
Ωℰ퐹 (휀) := {푡 ∈ Ω퐹 ∣ 휃(⋅,풢(푡)) ≥ 휀, 훾(푡, ⋅)-a.e} . (5.5)
We show next that for each 휀 > 0, Cournot 푆-equilibrium plans converge
to proﬁt maximizing plans of the limit economy for those ﬁrms having all
shareholders owning at least 휀 shares in them.
Theorem 5.4. Let (ℰ푛)푛∈ℕ with ℰ푛 = ((Ω퐶 ,ℱ푛, 휇푛퐶); (Ω퐹 ,풢푛); 휃푛) be a se-
quence of ﬁnite economies converging to ℰ = ((Ω퐶 ,ℱ , 휇퐶); (Ω퐹 ,풢); 휃), and
for each 푛 ∈ ℕ, let 푦푛 be a Cournot 푆-equilibrium of the economy ℰ푛, such
that 푦푛 → 푦, 휇퐹 -a.s.,17 where 휇퐹 = 휇퐶휃. Assume that there exists a unique
equilibrium price 푝 associated with the production plan 푦 in the limit economy
17The 휇퐹 -almost sure convergence of production plans can be replaced by convergence
in 휇퐹 -measure, since any sequence convergent in measure has a subsequence converging
almost surely (Dudley 2002, Theorem 9.2.1).
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ℰ (i.e. 푃 (푦) is a singleton). Then for any 휀 > 0, 푦 is proﬁt maximizing at
prices 푝 for 휇퐹 -almost all ﬁrms belonging to Ω
∗
퐹 (휀) :=
∩
푛∈ℕ Ω
ℰ푛
퐹 (휀).
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that 푦 is not proﬁt maximizing for a 휇퐹 -
positive measure of ﬁrms belonging to Ω∗퐹 (휀). Let 푦¯ be a proﬁt maximizing
production plan at price 푝, i.e.,
푝 ⋅ 푦¯(푡) = max
푧∈푌횥(푡)
푝 ⋅ 푧,
such that ﬁrms of the same type choose identical production plans, thus 푦¯
is selected to be 2풥 × [0, 1]-measurable. Notice that 푦¯ is 풢푛-measurable,
for any 푛 ∈ ℕ. The boundedness of the production sets implies that 푦¯ is
bounded as well. Construct the 풢-measurable function 푑 : Ω퐹 → ℝ deﬁned
as 푑(⋅) := 푝 ⋅ 푦¯(⋅) − 푝 ⋅ 푦(⋅) ≥ 0 and for all 푛, let 푑푛 : Ω퐹 → ℝ, 푑푛(⋅) :=
푝 ⋅ 푦¯(⋅) − 푝 ⋅ 푦푛(⋅) ≥ 0, which is 풢푛-measurable. Therefore there exists a set
푇 ∈ 풢 and 훿 > 0 such that 푇 ⊂ {푑 > 0} ∩ Ω∗퐹 (휀) and 휇퐹 (푇 ) = 훿 > 0.
Since 푇 ⊂ ∪푘∈ℕ {푑 ≥ 1/푘} ∩ Ω∗퐹 (휀), we can choose 푘 ∈ ℕ and 푇 ′ ⊂ 푇 such
that 푇 ′ ⊂ {푑 ≥ 1/푘} ∩ Ω∗퐹 (휀) and 휇퐹 (푇 ′) > 훿/2. Moreover, for any 푛 ∈ ℕ,
{푑 ≥ 1/푘} ⊂ {∣푑− 푑푛∣ ≥ 1/(2푘)} ∪ {푑푛 ≥ 1/(2푘)}, and thus for all 푚 ∈ ℕ,
{푑 ≥ 1/푘} ⊂ (∪푛≥푚 {∣푑− 푑푛∣ ≥ 1/(2푘)}) ∪ (∩푛≥푚 {푑푛 ≥ 1/(2푘)}) .
As 푦푛 → 푦 휇퐹 -a.s., it follows that 푑푛 → 푑 휇퐹 -a.s., and hence
lim
푚→∞
휇퐹 (∪푛≥푚 {∣푑− 푑푛∣ ≥ 1/(2푘)}) = 0.
Choose 푁 large enough such that 휇퐹 (∪푛≥푁 ∣푑− 푑푛∣ ≥ 1/(2푘)) < 훿/4. Thus
there exists 푇 ′′ ⊂ 푇 ′ with 휇퐹 (푇 ′′) > 훿/4 such that
푇 ′′ ⊂ ∩푛≥푁{푑푛 ≥ 1/(2푘)} ∩ Ω∗퐹 (휀). (5.6)
As 풢푁 is ﬁnite, it has an atom 퐺푁 such that 휇퐹 (푇 ′′ ∩ 퐺푁) > 0. Moreover
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퐺푁 is a ﬁnite union of atoms of 풢푁+1, hence we can construct inductively a
sequence (퐺푛)푛≥푁 with 퐺푛 being an atom of 풢푛, such that
∀푛 ≥ 푁 : 퐺푛 ∩ 푇 ′′ ⊂ {푑푛 ≥ 1/(2푘)} ∩ Ωℰ푛퐹 (휀), 휇퐹 (퐺푛 ∩ 푇 ′′) > 0, (5.7)
and, moreover, 퐺푛+1 ⊂ 퐺푛 for all 푛 ≥ 푁 . Since {푑푛 ≥ 1/(2푘)}∩Ωℰ푛퐹 (휀) ∈ 풢푛,
it follows that
퐺푛 ⊂ {푑푛 ≥ 1/(2푘)} ∩ Ωℰ푛퐹 (휀), ∀푛 ≥ 푁. (5.8)
Deﬁne the alternative production plans
푦ˆ푛 = 푦푛 + (푦¯ − 푦푛)1퐺푛 .
Given that 퐺푛 is an atom of 풢푛, ∩푛≥푁퐺푛 is either an atom of 풢 or equals
the empty set.18 Since the limit economy is atomless, 휇퐹 (퐺푛) ↘ 0. This
implies that 푦ˆ푛 converges in measure to 푦, and hence it converges almost
surely to 푦 along a subsequence. Consider a price selection p푛 associated to
푦푛 (that is, (p푛, 푦푛) is Cournot 푆-equilibrium for ℰ푛). Let 푝푛 = p푛(푦푛) and
푝ˆ푛 = p푛(푦ˆ푛). By Proposition 5.3, 휇
푛
퐶 ∘ 푤˜−1푦ˆ푛 → 휇퐶 ∘ 푤˜−1푦 . Since the price
correspondence 푃 (⋅) has closed graph and 푝ˆ푛 ∈ 푃
(
휇푛퐶 ∘ 푤˜−1푦ˆ푛
)
, it follows that,
for any convergent subsequence (푝ˆ푛푟) of (푝ˆ푛),
lim
푟→∞
푝ˆ푛푟 ∈ 푃
(
lim
푟→∞
휇푛푟퐶 ∘ 푤˜−1푦ˆ푛푟
)
= 푃 (휇퐶 ∘ 푤˜−1푦 ) = {푝}.
Repeating the reasoning for (푝푛)푛 we can assume without loss of generality
that 푝푛, 푝ˆ푛 → 푝, rather than selecting a subsequence where convergence holds.
Equation (5.8) implies that for all 푛 ≥ 푁 ,
푝(푤푦ˆ푛(푠)− 푤푦푛(푠)) = 휃푛(푠,퐺푛)푑푛(퐺푛) ≥
휀
2푘
, for 훾푛(퐺푛, ⋅)-a.e. 푠 ∈ Ω퐶 .
(5.9)
18If 푡 ∈ ∩푛≥푁퐺푛, it is shown in the Appendix A that 풢(푡) = ∩{퐺 ∣ 푡 ∈ 퐺,퐺 ∈ ∪푛풢푛},
hence ∩푛≥푁퐺푛 = 풢(푡).
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We show that there exists 훿 > 0, such that for all 푛 ≥ 푁 ,
푉 횤(푠)(푝ˆ푛, 푤푦ˆ푛(푠)) > 푉
횤(푠)(푝푛, 푤푦푛(푠)) + 훿, for 훾푛(퐺푛, ⋅)-a.e. 푠 ∈ Ω퐶 , (5.10)
which contradicts the Cournot 푆-eﬃciency of the production plans 푦푛.
Indeed, if (5.10) is not satisﬁed, we can choose a subsequence (푛푟)푟∈ℕ, a
type 푖 ∈ ℐ and a sequence of consumers (푠푛푟)푟∈ℕ ∈ Ω퐶 such that 횤(푠푛푟) =
푖, 훾(퐺푛푟 ,ℱ푛푟(푠푛푟)) > 0 and 푉 푖(푝ˆ푛푟 , 푤푦ˆ푛푟 (푠푛푟)) ≤ 푉 푖(푝푛푟 , 푤푦푛푟 (푠푛푟)) + 1/푟, for
all 푟 ∈ ℕ. The sequence of production plans (푦ˆ푛푟) are uniformly bounded,
thus the sequences of intermediate endowments (푤푦ˆ푛푟 (푠푛푟))푟∈ℕ and (푤푦푛푟 (푠푛푟))푟∈ℕ
are also bounded and therefore contain converging subsequences. We can
thus assume, without loss of generality, that 푤푦푛푟 (푠푛푟) → 푤 ∈ ℝ퐿 and
푤푦ˆ푛푟 (푠푛푟) → 푤ˆ ∈ ℝ퐿. Taking limits with 푟 → ∞ and using the continu-
ity of the indirect utility function 푉 푖, we obtain 푉 푖(푝, 푤ˆ) ≤ 푉 푖(푝, 푤) and
thus 푝 ⋅ 푤ˆ ≤ 푝 ⋅ 푤. Notice that, by (5.9),
푝(푤푦ˆ푛푟 (푠푛푟)− 푤푦푛푟 (푠푛푟)) ≥
휀
2푘
, ∀푟 ∈ ℕ. (5.11)
Taking the limit with 푟 →∞ in (5.11), we obtain 푝 ⋅ 푤ˆ ≥ 푝 ⋅ 푤 + 휀
2푘
, and we
reached a contradiction.
The theorem relies heavily on the assumption that there is a unique equi-
librium price corresponding to the limit production plan 푦 in the atomless
economy. This condition is needed to insure continuity of the price selec-
tion at the limit point. While we cannot dispense with it completely, the
requirement can be considerably relaxed, with a construction as in Roberts
(1980). That approach allows for multiplicity of equilibria at the limit point,
but requires regularity of the limit equilibrium and thus its local uniqueness.
Even so, it remains a strong condition since, as shown by Roberts himself,
existence of critical equilibria is non-pathological.
Allen (1994) pointed out that this negative result is alleviated if, instead
of simple price selections, one uses randomized price selections (i.e., selec-
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tions from the correspondence 푐표푃 instead of 푃 ; this amounts to saying that
ﬁrms hold non-trivial beliefs over the possible market clearing prices). As
opposed to the case of simple price selections, the existence of continuous
randomized price selections is a generic result (see also Mas-Colell and Nach-
bar (1991)). Allen proves therefore that, if ﬁrms maximize their expected
proﬁts with respect to some non-trivial beliefs over prices, convergence of
Cournot equilibria (in which ﬁrms maximize proﬁts) to competitive equilib-
ria does obtain generically. However, the problem is more complex here and
Allen’s approach cannot be directly applied. The reason is that, as opposed
to the standard Cournot model in which the ﬁrms maximize proﬁts, in our
model 푆-eﬃciency requires ﬁrms to make pairwise comparisons between a
status quo and an alternative. For that, a ﬁrm has to use its beliefs over
two diﬀerent equilibrium sets. To make this comparison meaningful, some
global beliefs need to be deﬁned. This was done in Bejan (2008). Whether
allowing for ﬁrms’ non-trivial global beliefs over prices does indeed improve
the convergence result is an interesting question which remains open for now
and will be subject of future research.
For the diﬀuse ownership economy ℰ푑푛 (see equations (3.6),(3.7)) Ωℰ
푑
푛
퐹 (휀) =
∅, for all 휀 > 0 and large enough 푛. Thus Ω∗퐹 (휀) = ∅, and Theorem 5.4
holds trivially and is devoid of implications. For the concentrated ownership
case described in (3.4),(3.5), Ω
ℰ푐푛
퐹 (휀) = Ω퐹 for every 0 < 휀 < min푖,푗 푠(푖, 푗).
Moreover, for this particular case, Theorem 5.4 goes through if we require
just weak convergence (convergence in distribution) of the production plans.
For a production plan 푦 : (풥 × [0, 1], 2풥 ⊗ ℬ([0, 1]), 휆풥 ⊗ 휆) → ℝ퐿, we let
ℒ(푦) be the distribution of (푦(1, ⋅), . . . , 푦(퐽, ⋅)) : [0, 1] → (ℝ퐿)퐽 and refer to
it as the law of 푦. Thus ℒ(푦) := 휆 ∘ (푦(1, ⋅), . . . , 푦(퐽, ⋅))−1.
Theorem 5.5. For each 푛 ∈ ℕ, let 푦푛 be a Cournot 푆-equilibrium of the
concentrated ownership economy ℰ푐푛 and 푦 be a production plan in ℰ푐, such
that the law of 푦푛 converges weakly to the law of 푦. Assume that there exists
a unique equilibrium price 푝 associated with the production plan 푦 in the limit
28
economy ℰ푐 (i.e. 푃 (푦) is a singleton). Then 푦 is proﬁt maximizing at prices
푝.
Proof. By Skorohod’s embedding theorem (Kallenberg 2002, Theorem 4.30),
there are alternative production plans (푦˜푛)푛∈ℕ, 푦˜, deﬁned on (풥 × [0, 1], 2풥 ⊗
ℬ([0, 1]), 휆풥 ⊗휆), such that for all 푛 ∈ ℕ, (푦˜푛(1, ⋅), . . . , 푦˜푛(퐽, ⋅)) has the same
distribution as (푦푛(1, ⋅), . . . , 푦푛(퐽, ⋅)), that is ℒ(푦푛) = ℒ(푦˜푛)), ℒ(푦˜) = ℒ(푦),
and 푦˜푛 → 푦˜ 휇퐹 -a.s., where 휇퐹 := (휆풥 ⊗ 휆).
The intermediate endowment of an agent (푖, ⋅) given the production plan
푦′ ∈ {푦푛, 푦˜푛} is 푤푦′(푖, ⋅) = 푒푖 +
∑
푗∈풥 푠(푖, 푗)푦
′(푗, ⋅). The laws ℒ(푦푛),ℒ(푦˜푛)
coincide, thus by the continuous mapping theorem (Dudley 2002, Theorem
9.3.7), for all 푖 ∈ ℐ the distributions of 푤푦푛(푖, ⋅), 푤푦˜푛(푖, ⋅) are identical, that
is 휆 ∘푤−1푦푛 (푖, ⋅) = 휆 ∘푤−1푦˜푛 (푖, ⋅). It follows that the distribution of intermediate
endowments across types for the two plans coincide, 휇퐶 ∘ 푤˜−1푦푛 = 휇퐶 ∘ 푤˜−1푦˜푛 .
Let 푧 ∈ 푦푛({푗} × [0, 1]) ⊂ ℝ퐿, and 퐴 := (푦˜푛(푗, ⋅))−1(푧). Since 휆(퐴) =
휆((푦푛(푗, ⋅))−1(푧)), there exists 푘 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛} such that 휆(퐴) = 푘/푛. Us-
ing Liapunov’s convexity theorem (휆 is atomless) we can construct disjoint
sets 퐴1, . . . , 퐴푘 ⊂ [0, 1] such that 퐴 = ∪푘푙=1퐴푙 and 휆(퐴푙) = 1/푛 for all
푙 ∈ {1, . . . , 푘}. Repeating this process, for each 푗 ∈ 풥 we can partition
[0, 1] into some sets 퐴푗1, . . . , 퐴
푗
푛 with 휆(퐴
푗
푙 ) = 1/푛 for all 푙 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛}, and
such that 푦˜푛 is measurable with respect to the partition 풢˜푛 := {{푗}×퐴푗푙 ∣ 푗 ∈
풥 , 푙 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛}} of 풥 × [0, 1].
Notice that 푦˜푛 is a Cournot 푆-eﬃcient production plan for the economy
ℰ˜푛 := ((Ω퐶 ,ℱ 푐푛, 휆ℐ⊗휆), (Ω퐹 , 풢˜푛, 휆풥 ⊗휆)). Otherwise, Cournot 푆-eﬃciency of
the plan 푦푛 in the economy 퐸
푐
푛 would be contradicted. Moreover, 푦˜ satisﬁes
also the singleton property because 푦 and 푦˜ generate identical distributions
of intermediate endowments in ℰ푐, hence 푃 (푦˜) = 푃 (푦).
If 풢˜푛 ↗ 2풥 ⊗ℬ([0, 1]), the sequence of economies (ℰ˜푛) converges to ℰ푐 and
the Cournot 푆-eﬃcient production plans (푦˜푛) converge almost surely to 푦˜.
Theorem 5.4 applies and we conclude that 푦 is proﬁt maximizing on Ω∗퐹 (휀).
For every 0 < 휀 < min푖,푗 푠(푖, 푗) (see equation (3.4)), Ω
∗
퐹 (휀) = Ω퐹 .
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Assume now that the sequence (풢˜푛)푛∈ℕ is not necessarily monotonically
increasing. The monotonicity of the sequence of 휎-algebras (풢˜푛), coupled
with the setwise convergence of the ownership structures, was used to estab-
lish the convergence in distribution of the sequence of intermediate endow-
ments. However we proved this fact directly here, using the strong symmetry
properties of the ownership structure. Also the atoms (퐺푛), in equation (5.8)
cannot be guaranteed to be monotonically decreasing. Nevertheless, all that
is needed is that 휇퐹 (퐺푛) → 0, which is automatically satisﬁed, since for
any atom 퐺푛 of 풢˜푛, 휇퐹 (퐺푛) = 1/(푛 ⋅ 퐽). The proof of Theorem 5.4 can be
replicated without any additional changes, obtaining the conclusion.
A direct proof of Theorem 5.5, without the use of Theorem 5.4, was given
in Bejan (2005). Convergence in distribution is too weak for Theorem 5.4,
in which we allow for heterogeneity in the ownership of ﬁrms and consumers
of identical type. Given an arbitrary production plan, one can permute
the choices of identical type ﬁrms, resulting in two production plans with
identical distributions; however, in the presence of asymmetric ownership
the two plans induce diﬀerent distributions over the space of intermediate
endowments.
Based on the examples provided so far, one might think that a sequence of
Cournot 푆-equilibria of a converging sequence of ﬁnite economies approaches
a Cournot 푆-eﬃcient equilibrium of the limit economy. If true, this property
would imply, according to Proposition 4.3, that sequences of Cournot 푆-
equilibria of converging ﬁnite economies approach the Walrasian equilibria
of the limit economy if Ω푚푎푥퐹 deﬁned in (4.3) is a full-measure set. The
following example shows that this is not true and thus sequences of Cournot
푆-equilibria do not converge to a Cournot 푆-equilibrium of the limit economy.
Example 5.1
We modify slightly the example of section 2, by removing the consumer that
does not own shares in the prototype economy, and letting the endowments
of the unique agent of the prototype economy be (2, 2). Assume that in the
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ﬁnite 푛-fold replica ℰ푛 and in the continuum replica ℰ∞, half of each ﬁrm is
owned exclusively by the agent with the same name and the rest is uniformly
distributed across all agents (including the agent with the same name). We
will refer to this way of assigning ownership of the ﬁrms in the replicas as
the hybrid ownership structure.
Given a production plan 푦 = ((−훼푗, 훼푗))푛푗=1 in the 푛-fold replica ℰ푛 , the
resulting exchange equilibrium price vector, normalized to the unit simplex,
is
(푝1, 푝2) =
(
2 + 휅(푦)
4
,
2− 휅(푦)
4
)
,
with 휅(푦) deﬁned as in (2.1). For the continuum replica, prices have the
same expression, with 휅(푦) deﬁned in (2.2). The Walrasian equilibrium in
the ﬁnite and continuum replica economies are associated with prices (1
2
, 1
2
)
and 휅(푦) = 0, hence all ﬁrms choose the production plan (0, 0) in a Walrasian
equilibrium.
We start by determining the Cournot 푆-eﬃcient production plans in the
푛-fold replica economy. The wealth of a consumer that is a majority share-
holder in a ﬁrm choosing (−훼, 훼) is
푤(휅(푦), 훼) = 2 +
1
2
(푝2 − 푝1)(훼 + 휅(푦)) = 2− 1
4
휅2(푦)− 1
4
휅(푦)훼,
and its utility is 푢(휅(푦), 훼) = 2 ln푤(휅(푦), 훼) − ln (2푝1) − ln (2푝2). We let
휅 := 휅(푦) for brevity. Notice that
∂푢 (휅, 훼)
∂휅
=
2
푛
(휅3 − 4훼)
(휅훼 + 휅2 − 8) (휅+ 2) (휅− 2) , (5.12)
and it follows that the derivative of 푢 with respect to 훼 is negative:
푑푢(휅, 훼)
푑훼
=
1
푛
∂푢 (휅, 훼)
∂휅
+
∂푢 (휅, 훼)
∂훼
=
2
푛
(휅3 − 8푛휅− 4훼 + 2푛휅3)
(휅훼 + 휅2 − 8) (휅+ 2) (휅− 2) < 0.
Thus a ﬁrm that chooses (−훼, 훼) hurts its majority shareholder by switching
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to a production plan (훼′, 훼′) with 훼′ > 훼. Moreover, (5.12) shows that
by switching to a production plan (훼′, 훼′) with 훼′ < 훼, the ﬁrm hurts a
minority shareholder that owns half of a ﬁrm that chose a production plan
(−훽, 훽) satisfying (휅− 훼
푛
)3 ≥ 4훽. This discussion enables us to construct a
multitude of Cournot 푆-equlibria. In particular, for any 푘 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 푛−1},
a production plan with 푘 ﬁrms choosing (0, 0) and 푛−푘 ﬁrms choosing (−1, 1)
is always a Cournot 푆-equilibrium.
The economies (ℰ푛) and ℰ∞ can be embedded in the general framework of
section 3 as discussed there, by letting 휃푛 = 휃
푐
푛/2 + 휃
푑
푛/2 and 휃 = 휃
푐/2 + 휃푑/2
(see (3.4)-(3.9)). Notice that for the limit economy, Ω푚푎푥퐹 = Ω퐹 = [0, 1] (since
ℐ = 풥 = {1}, we identify {1} × [0, 1] with [0, 1]) and thus by Proposition
4.3, the only Cournot 푆-equilibrium allocation of the continuum economy
ℰ∞ coincides with the Walrasian equilibrium and corresponds to all ﬁrms
choosing (0, 0). This can be seen directly, also, since in the absence of price
eﬀects, any ﬁrm that chose (−훼, 훼) with 훼 > 0 will increase the wealth and
hence the utility of its majority shareholder by switching to (0, 0), while its
minority shareholders are unaﬀected. Moreover, Ω∗퐹 = ∅, hence Theorem
5.4 has no bite in this example, suggesting that a sequence of Cournot 푆-
equilibrium plans does not converge necessarily to a proﬁt maximization
plan.
Indeed, for an arbitrary 휂 ∈ [0, 1], consider the production plan 푦휂 in
the continuum economy in which ﬁrms in [0, 휂] choose the production plan
(−1, 1) and the ﬁrms in (휂, 1] choose (0, 0). Let the production plan 푦휂푛 in
the economy ℰ푛 be such that the ﬁrst [푛 ⋅휂]∗ ﬁrms (i.e., ﬁrms in [0, [푛 ⋅휂]∗/푛])
choose (−1, 1) and the the rest choose (0, 0) ([푛 ⋅ 휂]∗ denotes the largest
integer smaller than 푛 ⋅ 휂). Clearly 푦휂푛 → 푦휂 almost surely and (푦휂푛) is a
sequence of Cournot 푆-equilibrium production plans, but 푦휂 is not a proﬁt
maximizing plan unless 휂 = 0. This shows that a convergent sequence of
Cournot 푆-equilibrium production plans in converging economies does not
have to approach a Cournot 푆-equilibrium in the limit.
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6 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature on non-cooperative foundations of
Walrasian equilibrium, by pointing out to the ﬁrms’ ownership structure as
a potential source of ineﬃciency in arbitrarily large economies. If (some)
shareholders control a ﬁrm’s production decisions, its objective is shaped by
the interaction between the price and the income eﬀects on those sharehold-
ers’ welfare. Each of these eﬀects, and therefore the dominance of one over
the other, depends on the ownership structure.
In the light of Hart’s (1979) results, one may argue that proﬁt maxi-
mization (under a speciﬁc price normalization) is a justiﬁed objective for
an oligopolistic ﬁrm in a large economy, since gains obtained by deviating
to shareholders’ welfare improving plans are modest, and might easily be
outweighed by the inherent “costs” of ﬁnding and implementing such plans
among a large group. While this may be a convincing argument for ﬁrms
that are controlled by a large group of consumers, we ﬁnd it less compelling
for a ﬁrm controlled by a very small group of consumers (say, its Board of
Directors). The extreme case here would be sole ownership ﬁrms or, by an
extension, ﬁrms controlled by a small board of consumers with aligned inter-
ests. Our results suggest, for example, that if ﬁrms are controlled by a small
board with insigniﬁcant ownership of shares, market power ineﬃciencies can
persists in arbitrarily large economies. A suﬃcient condition for the elimina-
tion of those ineﬃciencies via increased competition is having board members
who own a signiﬁcant share (but not necessarily a majority) of the ﬁrm they
control. In general, we prove that Cournot 푆-equilibria of a converging se-
quence of ﬁnite economies approaches a Walrasian equilibrium of the limit
economy if for (almost) every ﬁrm, each of its (controlling) shareholders owns
a signiﬁcant (i.e., bounded away from zero) fraction of the ﬁrm. For arbi-
trary ownership structures, sequences of Cournot 푆-eﬃcient equilibria may
not converge to a Cournot 푆-equilibrium of the limit economy.
Although we do not model trade in shares, we do allow for arbitrary
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(ﬁxed) distributions of shares in each ﬁnite economy along the converging
sequence and identify the class of those ownership structures that are con-
ducive to competitive behavior. Our results bear implications even for richer
environments in which share trading is allowed. It shows, for example, that
perfectly competitive behavior will prevail in any large economy model of
security trade in which the (post-trade) equilibrium distribution of shares is
concentrated. On the other hand, perfect diversiﬁcation of individual port-
folios across ﬁrms (as predicted, for example, by mean-variance portfolio
selection models) might lead to ineﬃciencies.
On the technical side, the paper contributes to the literature by deﬁning
a suitable topology on the space of production economies, which generalizes
previous results and allows for full generality on the ownership structure.
Appendix
A Atoms of a countably generated 휎-algebra
Let 풜 be a 휎-algebra on Ω. Deﬁne a binary relation on Ω as: 푥 ∼ 푦 if
and only if 푥 ∈ 퐴,퐴 ∈ 풜 ⇒ 푦 ∈ 퐴. Equivalently, if for 푥 ∈ Ω, we deﬁne
풜(푥) := ∩{퐴 ∈ 풜 : 푥 ∈ 퐴}, then 푥 ∼ 푦 if and only if 푦 ∈ 풜(푥). It is easy
to see that “∼” is an equivalence relation, and hence 풜(푥) is the equivalence
class containing 푥. One is tempted to call 풜(푥) an atom of 풜, in the sense
of the deﬁnition in footnote 3. However, in general 풜(푥) /∈ 풜.
We show in what follows that if 풜 is a countably generated 휎-algebra,
i.e., if 풜 is generated by a countable subset of itself, then 풜(푥) ∈ 풜,∀푥 ∈ Ω.
This means that 풜(푥) is an atom of 풜, i.e., for all 퐵 ∈ 풜, either 풜(푥) ⊂ 퐵 or
풜(푥)∩퐵 = ∅. Let 풞 be a countable subset generating 풜, i.e. 풜 = 휎(풞), and
let 풞¯ be the algebra generated by 풞, which consists exactly of all elements
of 풞 together with all sets obtainable from ﬁnite sequences of set theoretic
operations on 풞. Thus 풞¯ is also countable. Fix a point 푥 ∈ 퐴, and let
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풞¯(푥) := ∩{퐶 ∈ 풞¯∣푥 ∈ 퐶}. Deﬁne
풟푥 := {퐴 ∈ 풜 ∣ 푥 /∈ 퐴} ∪ {퐴 ∈ 풜 ∣ 푥 ∈ 퐴, 풞¯(푥) ⊂ 퐴}.
It is easy to check that 풟푥 is a 휆-system, which means that it contains Ω and
is closed under proper diﬀerences and increasing limits. Moreover 풞¯ ⊂ 풟푥,
and 풞¯ is a 휋−system (i.e. is closed under ﬁnite intersections). The monotone
class theorem (Kallenberg 2002, Th. 1.1) implies that
풜 = 휎(풞¯) ⊂ 풟푥 ⊂ 풜,
and thus 풟푥 = 풜. It follows that 풞¯(푥) = 풜(푥), but 풞¯(푥) ∈ 풜 since 풞¯ is
countable.
B Construction of the 훾-kernel
Let 훼 := (휇퐶 ⊗ 휃)(Ω퐶 × Ω퐹 ) < ∞ and thus we can write 휇퐶 ⊗ 휃 = 훼 ⋅ Θ,
with Θ a probability on ℱ ⊗ 풢.
Deﬁne 휋퐶 , 휋퐹 to be the projection functions of (Ω퐶 ×Ω퐹 ,ℱ ⊗풢) on Ω퐶 ,
respectively on Ω퐹 . Since (Ω퐶 ,ℱ) is a Polish space, there exists a regular
conditional distribution of 휋퐶 given 휋퐹 , which will be a probability kernel
훾 from Ω퐹 to ℱ (Dudley 2002, Theorem 10.2.2). The probability 훾(푡, ⋅)
represents the ownership distribution of ﬁrm 푡 ∈ Ω퐹 over consumers. Let
Θ퐹 be the marginal on Ω퐹 of Θ. By construction, and using the fact that
휇퐶 ⊗ 휃 = 훼 ⋅ Θ, it follows that for any 푔 : Ω퐶 × Ω퐹 → ℝ, which is ℱ ⊗ 풢-
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measurable and 휇퐶 ⊗ 휃-integrable,∫
Ω퐶
[∫
Ω퐹
푔(푠, 푡)휃(푠, 푑푡)
]
휇퐶(푑푠) =
∫
Ω퐶×Ω퐹
푔(푠, 푡)(휇퐶 ⊗ 휃)(푑푠, 푑푡) (B.1)
=
∫
Ω퐹
[∫
Ω퐶
푔(푠, 푡)훾(푡, 푑푠)
]
(훼 ⋅Θ퐹 )(푑푡)
=
∫
Ω퐹
[∫
Ω퐶
푔(푠, 푡)훾(푡, 푑푠)
]
휇퐹 (푑푡),
and hence we obtained equation (3.3).
C Setwise convergence of measures on a ﬁl-
tration
For all 푛 ∈ ℕ, let 휈푛 be a measure on (Ω,풜푛) where 풜푛 is ﬁnite and 풜푛 ↗ 풜
(i.e. 풜푛 ⊂ 풜푛+1 and 풜 = 휎(∪푛퐴푛)), and let 휈 be a ﬁnite measure on (Ω,풜).
The next result provides suﬃcient conditions for the existence of extensions
(휈˜푛) of the measures (휈푛) to 풜 that converge setwise to 휈. This means that,
for all 푛 ∈ ℕ, the restriction of 휈˜푛 to 풜푛 coincides with 휈푛 (i.e. 휈˜푛∣풜푛 = 휈푛)
and 휈˜푛(퐴) → 휈(퐴) for all 퐴 ∈ 풜. Notice that if such extensions (휈˜푛) are to
exist, then for any 푚 and 퐴푚 ∈ 풜푚, lim푛→∞ 휈푛(퐴푚) = 휈(퐴푚). It turns out
that this condition is also suﬃcient, in the presence of a uniform boundedness
condition imposed on (휈푛).
Lemma C.1. Assume that
(i) For any 푚 ∈ ℕ and 퐴푚 ∈ 풜푚, lim푛→∞ 휈푛(퐴푚) = 휈(퐴푚),
(ii) There exists 퐿 > 0 such that 휈푛 ≤ 퐿 ⋅ 휈 for all 푛 ∈ ℕ, that is,
휈푛(퐴) ≤ 퐿 ⋅ 휈(퐴), ∀푛 ∈ ℕ,∀퐴 ∈ 풜푛.
Then (휈푛) have extensions to 풜 that converge setwise to 휈.
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Proof. For all 푛, label the atoms of 풜푛 as 퐴푛1 , 퐴푛2 , . . . , 퐴푛푘(푛). Deﬁne
휈˜푛(퐴) :=
푘(푛)∑
푖=1
휈푛(퐴
푛
푖 ) ⋅
휈(퐴 ∩ 퐴푛푖 )
휈(퐴푛푖 )
, ∀퐴 ∈ 풜.
Thus 휈˜푛 is constructed by summing the measures obtained as the conditionals
of 휈 with respect to each atom of 풜푛, scaled so that the measure of each atom
of 풜푛 coincides under 휈˜푛 and 휈푛. Clearly 휈˜푛 is a measure on 풜 which is equal
to 휈푛 when restricted to 풜푛. Deﬁne
풟 := {퐴 ∈ 풜 ∣ 휈˜푛(퐴)→ 휈(퐴)}.
Condition (i) implies that ∪푛풜푛 ⊂ 풟. In particular, Ω ∈ 풟. Moreover, 풟 is
closed under proper diﬀerences, since if 퐴,퐵 ∈ 풟 with 퐴 ⊂ 퐵, then
휈˜푛(퐵 ∖ 퐴) = 휈˜푛(퐵)− 휈˜푛(퐴)→ 휈(퐵)− 휈(퐴) = 휈(퐵 ∖ 퐴).
We will show that 풟 is closed under increasing limits. Let 퐴1, 퐴2, . . . disjoint
sets in 풟. Notice that 휈˜푛 (∪푚퐴푚) =
∑
푚 휈˜푛(퐴푚), since 휈˜푛 is a sum of a
ﬁnite number of measures, and 휈˜푛(퐴푚) ≤ 퐿 ⋅ 휈(퐴푚), while
∑
푚 휈(퐴푚) =
휈(∪푚퐴푚) <∞. Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem implies
lim
푛→∞
휈˜푛 (∪푚퐴푚) =
∑
푚
lim
푛→∞
휈˜푛(퐴푚) =
∑
푚
휈(퐴푚) = 휈(∪푚퐴푚).
It follows that ∪푚퐴푚 ∈ 풟. We proved that 풟 is a 휆-system containing the
algebra ∪푛풜푛 which is a 휋-system, being closed under ﬁnite intersections.
The 휋−휆 theorem (Kallenberg 2002, Theorem 1.1) implies that 풟 = 풜, and
hence we proved that, indeed, 휈˜푛 → 휈 setwise on 풜.
If a sequence of measures (휈˜푛) on풜 converges setwise to 휈, then 퐸 휈˜푛(푓)→
퐸휈(푓) for any bounded function 푓 : Ω → ℝ which is 풜-measurable (Stokey
and Lucas 1989, p.335). This result is strengthened in the next Lemma.
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Lemma C.2. Assume that for all 푛, 휈푛 has an extension to 풜 that converges
setwise to 휈. For all 푛 ∈ ℕ, let 푋푛 : Ω→ ℝ such that 푋푛 is 풜푛-measurable,
∣푋푛∣ < 푀 , and 푋푛 → 푋, 휈-almost surely, where 푋 : Ω→ ℝ is 풜-measurable.
Then lim푛→∞
∫
Ω
푋푛푑휈푛 =
∫
Ω
푋푑휈.
Proof. Let 휈˜푛 be an extension of 휈푛 to 풜 that converges setwise to 휈. 푋푛 is
풜푛-measurable, therefore
∫
Ω
푋푛푑휈푛 =
∫
Ω
푋푛푑휈˜푛. By the triangle inequality,∣∣∣∣∫
Ω
푋푛푑휈˜푛 −
∫
Ω
푋푑휈
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∫
Ω
∣푋푛 −푋∣푑휈˜푛 +
∣∣∣∣∫
Ω
푋푑휈˜푛 −
∫
Ω
푋푑휈
∣∣∣∣ . (C.1)
Pick 휀 > 0 arbitrary. Notice that∫
Ω
∣푋푛 −푋∣푑휈˜푛 ≤ 휀 ⋅ 휈˜푛(Ω) + 2푀 ⋅ 휈˜푛({∣푋푛 −푋∣ ≥ 휀}). (C.2)
Deﬁne 퐴푚 := ∪푛≥푚{∣푋푛 − 푋∣ ≥ 휀}. Since 푋푛 → 푋, 휈-a.s., it follows that
퐴푚 ↘ 퐴 with 휈(퐴) = 0. The triangle inequality implies
∣휈˜푛(퐴푛)− 휈(퐴)∣ ≤ 휈˜푛(퐴푛 ∖ 퐴) + ∣휈˜푛(퐴)− 휈(퐴)∣.
Since (퐴푛 ∖ 퐴) ↘ ∅, by the Vitali-Hahn-Saks theorem (Kopp 1984, p.34),
lim푚→∞ sup푛 휈˜푛(퐴푚 ∖ 퐴) → 0. As 휈˜푛(퐴) → 휈(퐴) and
∫
Ω
푋푑휈˜푛 →
∫
Ω
푋푑휈,
we can choose 푁1(휀) ∈ ℕ such that for all 푛 ≥ 푁1(휀), 휈˜푛({∣푋푛−푋∣ ≥ 휀}) ≤ 휀
and
∣∣∫
Ω
푋푑휈˜푛 −
∫
Ω
푋푑휈
∣∣ ≤ 휀. By the setwise convergence of 휈˜푛 to 휈, we can
choose 푁2(휀) ∈ ℕ such that 휈˜푛(Ω) ≤ 휈(Ω) + 휀, for all 푛 ≥ 푁2(휀). Equations
(C.1) and (C.2) imply that for all 푛 ≥ max{푁1(휀), 푁2(휀)},∣∣∣∣∫
Ω
푋푛푑휈˜푛 −
∫
Ω
푋푑휈
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 휀 ⋅ (휈(Ω) + 휀) + 2푀휀+ 휀.
Since 휀 can be chosen arbitrarily small, the conclusion follows.
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